Since lenders cannot observe the riskiness of the projects that borrowers could choose, interest rates alone cannot be used as an instrument to discipline borrowers. A credible threat to exclude borrowers who default more than a certain number of times from participating in the capital markets makes international debt contracts incentive compatible. Since larger borrowers get fewer chances to default, they choose safer projects and are therefore charged lower interest rates. Also, borrowers, after each successive default, switch to safer and safer projects, which may result in lower and lower interest rates. This paper provides empirical evidence supporting these two predictions. q 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Introduction
The literature on international lending suggests that borrowers who default on their loans should be charged higher interest rates on the subsequent loans they Ž contract for instance, see Feder and Just, 1977; Lindert and Morton, 1989; Ozler, . 1993 . This argument assumes that lenders can only imperfectly observe borrowers' risk characteristics. Hence, each instance of default conveys negative informa-tion about the borrower which causes lenders to revise upwards their estimates of Ž . the riskiness of the borrower see Spatt, 1985; Diamond, 1989 .
The riskiness of a borrower, however, also depends on the actions that the borrower could take, which lenders may be unable to observe or unable to write Ž enforceable contracts on see Harris and Raviv, 1979; Holmstrom, 1979; Townsend, . Ž . 1979; Diamond, 1984; Gale and Hellwig, 1985 . Stiglitz and Weiss 1983 demonstrates that interest rates alone cannot be used as an instrument to discipline the borrowers. A credible threat to exclude a borrower who defaults from participating in the capital markets may provide the appropriate incentives for Ž . borrowers Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983 . Chowdhry Ž . 1991 shows that it may be incentive compatible to allow a borrower to default a certain number of times before excluding him from participating in the capital markets. Since each instance of default reduces the borrower's accessibility to the capital markets, until he is completely excluded from the capital markets, the borrower switches to safer and safer projects after each successive default. Competitive lenders, rationally anticipating this, would reduce the interest rates they charge to borrowers with a history of defaults.
Defaults by borrowers may then have two opposing effects on interest rates that they are charged on subsequent loans. The negative effect of defaulting on the borrower's reputation may cause an increase in the rate of interest. The received view seems to consider this to be the obvious conclusion. But, since the borrower, anticipating an impending exclusion from the capital markets, becomes more cautious in project selection, the effect results in a lower rate of interest. The net result of these two opposite effects is ambiguous. Ž . Empirical evidence by Lindert and Morton 1989 seems to suggest that the effect causing the rate of interest to fall may be strong enough to dominate the opposite effect. Even though borrowers may face smaller interest rates after default, they are not better off since their access to the private capital markets is reduced as a result of the default. In other words, we cannot simply look at the level of interest rates faced by the borrowers to judge their creditworthiness.
Lindert and Morton, however, find this evidence puzzling. . Chowdhry 1991 also argues that larger international borrowers, precisely because their borrowing needs are large, have fewer alternatives and would be able to default and reenter the capital markets fewer number of times than would smaller borrowers. Consequently, they choose economic policies such that they are less likely to be in a situation in which they must default on their loans. This paper also supports this prediction, i.e. larger borrowers are perceived to be less risky and are charged smaller rates of interest.
Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 contains empirical evidence. Section 4 concludes.
The data
We collected data for 88 countries listed in the World Debt Tables 1983-1984 edition as developing countries. [1973] [1974] [1975] were too sparse and incomplete. Second, the publication of the data ceased after 1981. Third, the onset of the debt crisis in 1982, would make interpretation of the data for a period after 1981 much less clear.
Data on interest rates are on the publicized eurocurrency credits, which are Ž . expressed as a spread over the London Interbank Offered Rate LIBOR . The spread over LIBOR for each loan was weighted by the size of the loan to obtain an average for the year. Only loans denominated in the US dollar were included in ( )the calculation. Commitment and participation fees were ignored, assuming that the error caused by the omission of fee income is small and unsystematic.
We also compiled data on Institutional Investor's Country Credit Rating, which is based on a survey of nearly 100 international banks. Banks are asked to rate each country on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 representing the least credit-worthy country with the greatest chance of default and 100 representing the most credit-worthy with the least chance of default. Since these data were only available beginning in 1979, we only have 3 years of data for country ratings by Institu-Ž . tional Investor 1979 Investor -1981 . This variable is denoted Rating.
The data on the history of defaults by various countries were obtained from an Ž . appendix in Lindert and Morton 1989 . The paper lists countries that defaulted on privately held bonds in the period 1820-1929 and in the 1930s. Table 1 shows Ž . these data from Lindert and Morton 1989 . Ž . Chowdhry 1991 predicts a negative relationship between the interest rate faced by a borrowing country and its size. A negative relationship is also predicted between interest rates and default history. However, since these are ceteris paribus relationships, we need to control for other factors that might be important in determining these relationships.
First, since the distribution of all the principal ratios of the World Debt Tables is highly skewed, a log transformation of all these variables is taken.
Second, we introduce dummy variables for each of the six geographical regions shown in Table 1 . These dummy variables attempt to control for the different political risks associated with each of these geographical region.
Finally, we include a dummy variable for each year to control for any systematic movements in interest rates that might have occurred over the period 1976-1981. 1 To account for default history, three dummy variables are considered. The The interest rates are measured as percent spreads over the LIBOR, denoted Spread.
The size is measured by the variable Size. Since this variable is also skewed, a log transformation of this variable is taken.
The evidence
We run multiple regressions to test our propositions. Let us first look at the correlation matrix in Table 2. 1 Several non-academic accounts have documented such movements.
( )
Not surprisingly, a number of the principal ratios are highly correlated. The inferences about the standard errors for these variables, therefore, may not be correct. We rerun the regressions by dropping some of the highly correlated variables. Results are reported for both sets of regressions since the inferences about the standard errors of variables other than the principal ratios are meaningful in both sets of regressions.
All the regressions we run include the following as independent variables. The first set of regression results that we report has Spread as the dependent variable. Table 3 reports the results from OLS regressions. We analyzed the residuals to ensure that the regression assumptions are not violated.
The results are consistent with the predictions. First, notice that the relationship between Spread and log Size is negative and significant in all four regressions, which is consistent with the proposition that larger borrowers face lower interest rates. The evidence is also consistent with our other hypothesis that borrowers with a history of default face smaller interest rates. The coefficient for the dummy Ž . variable Default 1930s or before in Regressions 1 and 3 is negative as predicted, and the t-statistics associated are marginally significant. When we look at the Ž . Ž . regressions with the dummy variables Default 1820-1929 and Default 1930s , the coefficients are still negative, but not significant.
Let us now interpret the results for other variables. First, we observe that cross-sectional variations associated with different geographic regions exist. Countries from South and East Asia seem to enjoy the lowest spreads, whereas countries from Africa and Latin America face the highest spreads. Different political and economic factors may account for this variation in spreads.
Second, the evidence does seem to capture the trend of falling spreads over the period [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] . This trend has been documented by the followers of the Eurobank Syndicated Loan Market. Finally, let us look at the coefficients for various principal ratios. Since many of these ratios are highly correlated, the t-statistics in Regressions 1 and 2 are small. The signs of the coefficients in Regressions 3 and 4, however, seem plausible. The evidence indicates that countries with high ratios of total debt to export earnings were perceived as having higher default risks and consequently faced higher spreads. On the other hand, countries with higher ratios of international reserves to total debt were seen more capable of meeting their debt repayments and therefore faced smaller spreads.
We now look at some regressions with the same set of independent variables, but now with Rating as the dependent variable. Recall that these are country ratings compiled by the Institutional Investor in which banks are asked to score each country on a scale of 0 to 100 with higher score representing smaller probability of default. The results are presented in Table 4 .
The evidence for the relationship between Rating and log Size is positive and significant in all four regressions, which is consistent with the proposition that larger borrowers are seen as less likely to default resulting in higher ratings. The relationship between rating and default history, however, is much weaker. Most of the coefficients are positive, albeit with t-statistics not very large, consistent with our proposition that countries with default history are seen as less likely to default. Notice though that the sample size in these regressions is much smaller since we only had 3 years of data for Rating, whereas we had 6 years of data for Spread. Two of the coefficients are negative, but with extremely low t-statistics. Overall, the evidence is not very strong in favor of our hypothesis, but it is certainly not consistent with the competing hypothesis predicting an opposite relationship.
The results for cross-sectional variation based on geographic regions are somewhat different from previous regressions with Spread as the dependent variable but generally similar. The evidence on trend in worsening perception over the years about default probabilities is confirmed again. Finally, the evidence on the principal ratios is also consistent with our previous results. 
Conclusion
We have presented some evidence that indicates that countries with a history of defaults in the 1930s and prior periods were charged smaller interest rates by commercial banks in the period [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] . Notice that many of the countries in Table 1 that are classified as non-defaulting in our sample perhaps had no history of borrowing at all in the 1930s and prior periods. As a matter of fact, many of these countries were not even independent sovereign nations during those periods. One might wonder if our results are being driven by the fact that a large number of non-defaulting countries are either small -such as those from Sub-Sahara Africa -or from high risk regions such as Africa or Latin America. But notice that this result is obtained even though we do control for size, different geographical regions and other risk characteristics as measured by the principal ratios. Our results do confirm the suspicion that Sub-Sahara African and Latin American countries were charged the largest interest rates and suffered the lowest credit ratings. Southeast Asian countries, on the other hand, had the highest credit ratings and faced the lowest interest rates. We also find strong evidence that larger countries were perceived to be less risky and were charged lower interest rates.
